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ABSTRACT
Usually, scholarly research on security communities focuses on the conditions and
the consequences of their forming; rare are the works that examine how and why
these arrangements might decay and perhaps even disappear altogether. This is
hardly a surprise, given that in certain fortunate parts of the world, public and
elites alike have come to accept that interstate conflict, at least in their neighbor-
hood, is a vestige of the past. No matter how haphazardly managed relations
among them might be, the dominant expectation is that their security community
is virtually indestructible –or to put it in the vernacular, “idiot-proof.” 
This article critically examines that perspective. Specifically, it explores the
potential impact of ethnic (including for the purposes of this project, religious)
diasporas on continental security. The issue is framed from the point of view of the
U.S. debate, not only because that debate has so many implications for the United
States’ northern and southern neighbors, Canada and Mexico, but also because in
a real sense, it is those two neighbors who, for different reasons, are increasingly
stylized in the U.S. as the source of the problem.
Key words: homeland security, security communities, North America, terrorism, immigration,
Canada-U.S. relations, Mexico-U.S. relations.
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INTRODUCTION: TWO FRANKLINS AND A FRANKLYN
The story has it that as he was leaving the federal constitutional convention that had
gathered in Philadelphia midway through 1787 to design a new political framework
for the fledgling American republic, Benjamin Franklin was asked what he and the
other delegates had brought into existence through their heated deliberations.
Franklin’s cautionary response was, “a republic –if you can keep it.” So, too, might we
conceptualize a challenge facing the three North American countries in the twenty-
first century: namely, the preservation of what, in historical terms, is a fairly new (i.e.,
twentieth century) dispensation: their security community, or “zone of peace.”
A recent report of a high-level task force commissioned to study the commu-
nity-building prospects of Canada, the United States, and Mexico contained among
its series of recommendations one major proposal: that the three countries establish,
by 2010, a “North American economic and security community” (Haass, 2005). The
chairs of this 31-member task force were John Manley, William Weld, and Pedro
Aspe, respectively from Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. Their work was sponsored
by the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with the Cana-
dian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales.
Not surprisingly, given the ambitious nature of many of the report’s recommenda-
tions, some of the task force’s members were moved to append a dissenting, or oth-
erwise modifying, view to the set of proposals.1 What is surprising, however, is that
none challenged the contention that the three countries should be working toward
the construction of a security community.
Why this is surprising is that it really does misstate the problem, at least in the
realm of security: it is generally conceded –though there are some skeptics, as I dis-
cuss below– that for nearly three-quarters of a century, Canada, the U.S., and Mex-
ico have constituted a security community. The real challenge is whether, given the
variety of threats they face in this new century, they can preserve what is already
built. By security community is meant an order in which the use of force as a means
of conflict resolution among members of the group has simply become inconceivable;
i.e., they neither go to war against one another nor even consider doing so. Instead,
they undertake to resolve peacefully whatever problems inevitably arise among
them. With neither organized armed conflict nor the threat of such conflict playing
a part in the resolution of intra-group problems, policymakers and other policy elites
are able to entertain “dependable expectations” that peaceful change will be the only
kind of change that occurs (Adler y Barnett, 1996: 73).
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As noted above, some dissent to the contention that a North American security
community already exists can be encountered, usually in the case of the U.S.-Mex-
ican dyad.2 However, with respect to the Canada-U.S. tandem, one also confronts
occasional skepticism on the part of those who really do believe that organized
armed force might be employed by one country against the other. For instance, one
Kingston, Ontario-based peace activist (an American expatriate from Maine) man-
aged to publish a book in the early 1990s during the first Clinton administration
purporting that the choice of nearby Fort Drum in upstate New York as the base of
the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division bespoke aggressive designs on Canada!
(Rudmin, 1993). Even prior to the Clinton administration there had been some in
Canada who worried about a U.S. invasion, perhaps motivated by a desire to snatch
oil or some other precious commodity, and at least one Canadian novelist dined out
fairly regularly on this thesis during the early 1970s (see in particular Rohmer, 1973).
Today, a few policy analysts (including one prominent member of a recent
Liberal government) can be found fretting that a U.S. siphoning of Canadian water
has the potential to disturb the continental peace; while others (Conservatives, this
time) imagine that the disagreement over the status of the Northwest Passage –is it
or is it not an international strait?–3 could escalate into armed conflict. This last con-
cern managed to figure into the rhetoric of the most recent federal election cam-
paign, when Conservative leader Stephen Harper promised on December 22, 2005
to use military means if necessary to defend Canada’s claims to sovereignty in the
Arctic. As one observer has wryly commented, taking this pledge seriously could
result in the “insanity” of Canada’s having to launch depth charges from an ice-
breaker onto an American nuclear-powered submarine (Griffiths, 2006: A21).
Needless to say, should what Franklyn Griffiths brands as “insanity” come to
pass, we can all dismiss the Canada-U.S. security community as a relic of the past.
But as I will argue below, Canada-U.S. armed conflict in the far north is not a very
real prospect; if we are to see any significant weakening of the Canada-U.S. securi-
ty community, it will not be as a result of tensions in the Arctic, and Benjamin
Franklin’s implied question will not derive its contemporary security-community
significance in the scenario sketched by Griffiths. So, with Benjamin Franklin’s
query in mind, we might want to ask, bluntly, whether the North American zone of
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2 For a dissenting view, namely that the U.S. and Mexico are “still a long way from a deep or tightly cou-
pled Deutschian security community,” see González and Haggard, 1998: 326.
3 Though there is not much foreign objection to Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago,
things are different when it comes to the waterways separating some of the islands in the region, specifi-
cally the seven channels that link the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and that collectively bear the name,
Northwest Passage. See Charron, 2005: 831-48. For a discussion of the legal issues involved in determin-
ing whether a body of water is an international strait, see Haglund, 1989: 609-29.
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peace really is “idiot proof,” in the sense that nothing can be imagined that would
return any of the countries to their prior condition of having been bad instead of
good neighbors.
I use the term “good neighbors” advisedly, for it speaks to the historical peri-
od during which the North American security community got established, namely
a span of years covering the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Though it is
sometimes argued that the Canada-U.S. portion of North America constituted the
world’s first security community, the reality may be otherwise, with two Scandina-
vian states, Sweden and Norway, disputing the honors (after their peaceful, though
far from friction-free, breakup in 1905).4 As for Canada and the U.S., to the extent
planning for military action against one’s neighbor can be taken as evidence of the
nonexistence of a regional security community (conveying, however sotto voce, a
credible threat to employ force in conflict resolution), then not until such time as the
two abandoned this kind of activity can we say that they had established a security
community. In the Canadian case, it was not until the early 1920s that plans for mil-
itary operations against the U.S. ceased to be developed; while for the U.S., it would
take until 1937, when the War and Navy Departments discarded the obsolete “RED”
plans (red being the color code for the British Commonwealth and Empire) in favor
of the new “RAINBOW” plans directed at Germany, Italy, or Japan, or all three togeth-
er (Morton, 1960: 12-22). By contrast, the Scandinavians kicked the habit a few years
earlier, during the 1920s (Ericson, 2000).
Certainly with respect to the continent’s southernmost dyad, the U.S. and
Mexico, there can be no question about their contending for the title of world’s first
security community –not with Mexican irregulars invading New Mexico (as did
Pancho Villa in March 1916) or U.S. regular forces counterattacking on Mexican soil
(as General John Pershing did later in the same month).5 Still, the Mexican-American
dyad was not far behind the other two, as we can say that their security community
also took shape during the interwar period, when a) the Mexican Revolution had
consolidated to such a degree that no further insurrectionary raids into U.S. terri-
tory were easily conceivable, and b) U.S. foreign policy toward the country’s Latin
American neighbors finally incorporated a commitment to refrain from the use of force
against any of them. Both conditions were fulfilled during these years, the first being
the consolidation of the revolution under the “Northern Dynasty” of Alvaro Obre-
gón during the 1920s, and the second, Washington’s formal renunciation of a right
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4 For the argument that the two security communities arose at more or less the same time in the early twen-
tieth century, and eventually merged into one transatlantic security community, see Lebow, 1994: 271-72.
On the events leading to the rupture of Norway’s union with Sweden a century or so ago, see Stolleis,
2005: 35-48.
5 For these cross-border incursions, see Cline, 1963: 176-81.
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to intervene militarily in Latin America, made at two Pan-American conferences in
1933 and 1936 (in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, respectively) (Gellman, 1979).
Recently, some have asserted that the heavy militarization of the U.S.-Mexican
border constitutes prima facie proof that the security community has come to an end.
Those who make this argument confuse border controls with something else, name-
ly a state’s intention to do those things that would put an end to the security commu-
nity, such as plan or instigate armed conflict against the other. Tightened borders
might be regrettable, all things being equal, but they can no more be said to signal the
demise of a security community between sovereign countries (what Karl Deutsch
and his colleagues would term a “pluralistic security community”) than can the pres-
ence of an armed Ontario Provincial Police be said to vitiate a security community
within a sovereign state, in this case Canada (what Deutsch et al. call an “amalga-
mated security community”) (1957).
There are those who even argue that the failure to militarize the United States’
southwest border will jeopardize its national security, and by extension the securi-
ty community, by allowing into the country vast hordes of Mexicans, many of them
said to be bent upon the demographic reconquista of territories lost to Mexico more
than a century and a half ago. Those who do invoke this argument, such as Patrick
Buchanan,6 are making implicit reference to the concept of societal security,  a concept
that can be expected to figure increasingly in discussions about the future of the North
American security community. And though it may be incorrect to dispute the exis-
tence today of a security community between the U.S. and Mexico, it remains to be
seen whether that community will emerge unscathed from the emotional debate
attending illegal immigration into the U.S. from its southern neighbor.
SOCIETAL SECURITY: “MEXICANIZATION” OR “CANADIANIZATION”?
One of the contemporary ironies of discussions about borders within North Amer-
ica has been the growing frequency with which one encounters references to the
“Mexicanization” of the Canada-U.S. border.7 In the following section I am going to
address why the United States’ northern border should, of late, have emerged as an
object of physical security concern to many in Washington. In this section, I wish to
start by noting the irony associated with the current U.S. anxieties about societal
security, for in some respects they echo concerns first raised in the late nineteenth
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the Public Broadcasting System and chaired by John McLaughlin, 31 March 2006.
7 For a good discussion, see Andreas, 2005: 449-62.
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century as a result of virtually unchecked immigration from Canada (and elsewhere)
into the U.S. Thus from the point of view of societal security, we might more accu-
rately depict the current debate as representing the “Canadianization” of America’s
southern border.
There is certainly nothing singularly North American about the concept of so-
cietal security; in fact, the concept has figured largely in the work of certain European
scholars associated with the “Copenhagen School” of international relations theory.
Nor is there anything odd about Europe’s being the source of so much scholarly
thinking on the topic, as recent developments connected with the growing (and
substantial) immigration flows to Western Europe from Islamic countries testify. For
societal security is all about “identity,” those values and practices held in common by
a people who see themselves making up a distinct (even if not unique) society. The
menace in this case, then, is said to be to the collective identity of a people.8
For theorists associated with the Copenhagen School, there are three principal
threats to societal security: 1) migration in such volumes that a country’s identity and
values are held to be at risk of profound alteration (much of the current European
angst today, especially in the Netherlands, would fall under this category); 2) “hor-
izontal competition,” meaning the linguistic and cultural pull exerted by a powerful
neighbor on one’s own identity (as evidenced, for instance, in longstanding Canadian
anxieties about American cultural weight); and 3) “vertical competition,” with the
threat here coming from within a country, where one collective identity with a re-
gional base sets itself apart from the dominant identity (again, a familiar story in
Canada, given the never-ending discussion over Quebec’s place in the federation).9 
But if the concept may not be specific to North America, there can be no gain-
saying that concerns for societal security have a lengthy pedigree on this continent,
and not just in the U.S., either. However, since it is the U.S. whose sense of societal
insecurity frames so much of the current debate about the North American security
community, it is on it that I focus in this section. What strikes the analyst who follows
the vocal discussion currently going on in the U.S. over illegal (and even some legal)
forms of immigration is how unoriginal many of the concerns are, save that the first time
that Americans debated whether their national identity was being eroded by demo-
graphic pressure, it was often to the north not the south that they turned their gaze.
Consider the following demographic trends of an era that displayed all the hall-
marks of what would later be termed “globalization”: the last decades of the nine-
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teenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, a time that began, to
some, to look like the “Americanization” of the world.10 Although it might appear
that the dominant fact of that era was the outward projection of American economic
and military power, it was also a moment when the world –or at least what would
later be termed the “Western” world– was coming to the United States. One western
country’s population was especially showing up in U.S. cities and states: Canada’s.11
One chronicler of the population flow across the Canada-U.S. border during the
second half of the nineteenth century notes
[W]hile the population of the Republic was little more than tripling in fifty years, and
that of Canada was being multiplied by less than two and a half, the little Canada south
of the boundary line saw the number of its inhabitants multiplied by eight. Of all the liv-
ing persons of Canadian birth in 1900, more than one-fifth were settled in the United
States (Moffett, 1972: 10).
Though the process being limned by the above author was said to be “Amer-
icanization,” the statistics he deployed testified to a “Canadianization” redolent in
more than one respect of contemporary U.S. discussions of inflows from Mexico.
First there was the sheer magnitude of the phenomenon. In addition to the native-
born Canadians living in the U.S. at the turn of the last century (some 1.2 million),
there were another half million born in the U.S. of two Canadian parents, as well as
three-quarters of a million born of one Canadian and one American parent. Adding
all these groups together, one finds that “there were in all 2 480 613 persons in the
United States of at least half Canadian blood, which is more than half the number
of similar stock in Canada.” Indeed, of the top ten provincial/state jurisdictions in
North America measured in terms of their Canadian “stock,” half were located in the
United States, and Massachusetts was outranked as a “Canadian” sub-national juris-
diction in 1900 only by Ontario and Québec.12
Secondly was the qualitative dimension, and while it may strike us as odd today,
there were more than a few observers of immigration flows from Canada to the U.S.
a century ago who worried about the prospect of American identity being changed,
and for the worse. In ways that bear similarity to Samuel Huntington’s contemporary
suspicions regarding the assimilability of the United States’ large and growing His-
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panic (mainly Mexican) population (Huntington, 2004), so too was there anxiety in
the U.S. –especially in New England, where Professor Huntington teaches–13 about the
strain upon America’s “creedal” identity that was emanating from culturally distinc-
tive groups of immigrants hailing from the province of Québec. The quantity was
ominous enough, according to nativists who thought like this: over the course of the
century spanning 1840 and 1940, a total of 2.825 million Canadians would establish
themselves in the U.S., some 30 percent (825 000) of them from Quebec. Most of the
latter settled in New England, and at the height of the nativist anxiety over the “new”
(i.e., non-Anglo-Saxon) immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury,14 French Canadians constituted, at 575 000, 10 percent of the six-state region’s
total population.15
But the quality of these immigrants was positively frightening to nativists con-
vinced that American societal security was at risk, and possibly –who could say?–
American physical security also. Initially, the Roman Catholic church in Québec
looked dimly on the migrants who dared to make their lives in Protestant New
England, but after 1880 or so a new spirit began to manifest itself among the eccle-
siastical leaders in the province, for whom the diaspora raised the prospect of at least
a spiritual re-conquest of the once-disputed territories,16 with perhaps even a politi-
cal re-conquest looming in the bargain! This last was the dream of militants such as
Jules-Paul Tardivel,17 who wondered whether “l’Amérique française” could be expand-
ed to include at least the northeastern part of the U.S., with some Catholic extremists
allowing their imaginations freer rein, and foreseeing an America that would be
majority French within a century! (Weil, 1989: 30-34).
What was the dream of Catholic militants became the nightmare of some Brahmin
intellectuals, who had been digesting ideas related to the theory of “Anglo-Saxon”
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1981: 56.
14 An anxiety admirably traced in John Higham, 1971.
15 This was when Quebec’s own French-speaking population stood at less than 1.2 million, meaning that
some 30 percent of French Canadians were at the time living in New England.
16 After all, Samuel de Champlain had explored the coast of New England fifteen years before the landing of
the Pilgrims at Plymouth, and for a brief time the region was known as New France. And for many decades,
beginning with the War of the League of Augsburg in 1689 and ending when the Seven Years War did in 1763,
France and England disputed portions of present day New England, with a savagery that at times matched
anything seen elsewhere in the world during the contemporary era of so-called “ethnic cleansing.” For the
French exploration of the New England coast, see Forbes and Cadman, 1929, 3: 1; for intercolonial war-
fare, see Pellerin, 2001; and Leckie, 1999. The entire period is ably chronicled in Havard and Vidal, 2003.
17 Jules-Paul Tardivel, a journalist who championed the cause of French-Canadian nationalism in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century until his death in 1905, was ironically originally from the United States. He
was born in Kentucky, of parents who immigrated to America from England and France. He was an ultra-
conservative Roman Catholic (an ultramontane) who advocated an independent French-speaking (and
Catholic) country within North America, hoping to advance the interests of the Church and of French
Canadians in so doing.
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supremacy that was at its height of popularity at the turn of the last century, a theory
holding, inter alia, that all the worthwhile political values and institutions, includ-
ing and especially those that gave substance to America’s creedal identity, could be
traced back to the “Teutonic” forests of antiquity, in which were to be encountered
the first stirrings of democracy (Vann, 1958). Some worried that the Teutonic virtues
carried in the genes of freedom-loving Yankees would not be able to withstand the
onslaught from what was being styled by some the “Chinese of the East,” teeming
masses of French Canadians steeped in medieval religious mumbo-jumbo, speak-
ing a different language, and willing to work at any wage, thereby throwing virtuous
and proud Anglo laborers out of their jobs.
Things turned out well; in the end, the United States survived, Franco-Americans
assimilated, and if New England’s textile economy went into long and painful decline,
that was hardly the fault of the Quebeckers. Not only did the region reinvent itself,
but it remained an intellectual center of the country, its very “hub” for many New
Englanders as well as other Americans. To be sure, the regional, and even national,
identity had to have been affected as a result of the demographic flows that washed
over the United States at the height of the new immigration, but it would be hard for
anyone to make the argument that the country that would subsequently rise to glob-
al dominance had been hurt by the process. It was easier to sustain the opposite.18
And thus we might consider the current debate about the meaning of Mexican
immigration for American societal security by thinking of it as a new phase of an
established pattern. Obviously, that the nativist fears were proved wrong a century
ago, when the continental focus was more on the United States’ northern than its
southern border, need not mean that the fears of today are invalid. Still, there may be
merit in invoking the “Canadianization” analogy when we contemplate a possible
societal security challenge to the North American zone of peace. For what is said by
some to be at stake is a deterioration in the U.S.-Mexico relationship of such an order
of gravity as to call into question the irenic acquis of the past 70 years, and open once
again the prospect of either country planning or using force against the other.
How could this deterioration happen? The crux of the contemporary alarmism
about societal security is found in the nightmare scenario of the nativists: to wit, of the
United States becoming, in effect, the Disunited States, and doing so as a result of
the replacement of a unifying assimilationist ethic by a divisive multiculturalist one. This
vision has been adumbrated in fairly recent statements about the impact of ethnic
politics upon the United States’ future, especially by historian Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr. (1998). In this fissiparous perspective, shared inter alios by Samuel Huntington
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and Patrick Buchanan, it is the Mexican diaspora that proves particularly trouble-
some, bent as it presumably is on a reconquista of lost territory in the Southwest,
whose proportions could only have been the envy of the Tardivels of the nineteenth
century.
But there is reason to doubt that this nightmare scenario represents much of a
threat, after all. Firstly, it still needs to be shown why the United States of a century
ago, with fully a third of its population foreign-born, should have been so thorough-
ly capable of preserving –indeed strengthening– its national unity, while the United
States of today, with only a tenth of its population foreign-born, must succumb to the
pressure of ethnic diasporas.19 Secondly, it needs to be demonstrated why fellow
North Americans, which is what the Mexicans are, should prove to be more incapable
of assimilation in the twenty-first century than were immigrants from the other side of
the Atlantic –or for that matter, of the St. Lawrence!– a century and more ago. Indeed,
some authors have argued not only that U.S. Latinos are at least as readily assimi-
lated as, if not more so than, most previous ethnic diasporas, but that their growing
presence in U.S. society gives the country a set of cultural (including linguistic) assets
that will redound to its advantage in the future struggle for international influence,
as well as market share, not only in the Western Hemisphere but throughout a world
in which Spanish is exceeded only in importance by English as a global tongue. It is
for this reason that one Brazilian academic writing in France could proclaim a
dozen or so years ago (and not to French delight) that “the twenty-first century will
be American” (Valladão, 1996).20
On balance, the societal security dilemma that currently may (or may not) be
affecting the U.S. is unlikely to do much to unseat the U.S.-Mexican security com-
munity.21 This is not to say that political developments in Mexico itself, in particular
an electoral turn toward the kind of nativist populism on display elsewhere in Latin
America (e.g., Venezuela and Bolivia) may not have a negative effect on the country’s
relationship with the U.S., but that need not, and probably would not, put an end to
the security community, should such an electoral turn come to pass in future. Instead,
on the question of societal security and the North American security community,
there is at least as much of a basis for an optimistic reading as for a pessimistic one
–maybe more of a basis– and this because of the continuing power of assimilative
factors even in a United States thought to be “multicultural”.22
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CANADA-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS: A NEW FENIANISM?
If it is ironic to discover that today’s American societal-security concerns stimulated
by Mexican immigrants bear some resemblance to earlier anxieties about Canadian
immigration, it is no less ironic to discover that U.S. policy elites have begun to
regard their northern border, the much-ballyhooed “longest undefended border” in
the world, with growing trepidation from the point of view of physical not societal
security, i.e., the kind of security woes that were once thought to be exclusively
related to the border with Mexico. This is why, as noted above, one hears more and
more references to the “Mexicanization” of the Canada-U.S. border, as inaccurate as
the imagery may be. For if it is true that from the standpoint of societal security it
is clearly the U.S.’s southern frontier that is at the crux of the matter, the same does
not apply when we turn to a discussion of the country’s physical security.
For reasons I address in this section, U.S. policy elites have begun to regard
Canada with a much more jaundiced eye than heretofore, even if for the great U.S.
public, unencumbered as it is by much knowledge of its northern neighbor, Canada
continues to be held in lofty esteem.23 Nor is there anything new in a U.S. public’s
continually fawning over a people and a country that does not reciprocate the affec-
tion (see Freeman, 2005: A18). What Frank Underhill related nearly half a century
ago remains true today: “Americans...are benevolently ignorant about Canada,
whereas Canadians are malevolently informed about the United States” (Underhill,
1961: 256-57).
This is not to suggest that those Americans who actually know something
about Canada, i.e., the policy elites, are harboring aggressive designs on a neighbor
that has grown increasingly annoying to them of late, but neither is it particularly
shocking to read that, for some of these elites at least, Canada is being adjudged a
“security threat to the United States” (Sapolsky, 2005: 31). What analysts such as
MIT’s Harvey Sapolsky mean when they say this is that, starting at the middle of the
previous decade and continuing down to the present, Canadian governments have
made it their purpose to attempt to constrain U.S. power and influence, inter alia by
leading campaigns such as those that resulted in the ban on antipersonnel land mines
and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Not only does this kind
of critique understate if not ignore completely those many things Canada does that
assist the U.S.,24 but it also misidentifies the real challenge. To the (slim) extent that the
23 An early 2006 Gallup national opinion survey found that the United Kingdom and Canada remained the
two countries most favorably regarded by Americans, both eliciting positive scores of more than 80 per-
cent (Koring, 2006: A17). 
24 For a useful corrective, see Sokolsky, 2006: 29-43.
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Canada-U.S. security community will be put into jeopardy in coming years, it will have
much less to do with any ongoing Canadian tendency to wish to pluck the eagle’s tail
feathers, and much more to do with a phenomenon that bears a resemblance to a se-
curity challenge that once dramatically affected security relations between the two
North American neighbors. Let us refer to this phenomenon as the “New Fenianism.”
As noted earlier in this article, the Canada-U.S. security community is one of
the world’s oldest. Emblematic of this North American zone of peace has been and
remains a reciprocal commitment made by the two states, namely to regard each
other’s legitimate physical security interests as being virtually tantamount to their
own. It is no exaggeration to state that this commitment underpins the entire appa-
ratus of Canada-U.S. security cooperation. The commitment took shape at the same
moment the security community was forming, during the crisis atmosphere of the
late 1930s, when a war in Europe was looming, and when it seemed that American
security might be imperiled should Canadian involvement in the European war
make the Monroe Doctrine untenable.
We can call this norm the “Kingston dispensation,” as it first was made explicit
in an address delivered by Franklin D. Roosevelt at Queen’s University, in Kingston,
Ontario, during the August 1938 Sudetenland crisis. The president told his audi-
ence that the United States would “not stand idly by” were the physical security of
Canada threatened by a European adversary, as a consequence of the country’s par-
ticipation in a European war. For his part, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, speaking
a few days later (though not in Kingston), pledged that Canada would ensure that
nothing it did would jeopardize the physical security of the United States. Taken
together, the two leaders’ remarks constitute the normative core of the Canada-U.S.
security relationship: each country understood that it had a “neighborly” obligation
to the other to demonstrate nearly as much solicitude for the other’s physical security
needs as for its own (see Fortmann and Haglund, 2002: 17-22).
The Kingston dispensation was not quite an alliance, but it would only take two
more years before a bilateral alliance did get forged in North America, an alliance
that remains the United States’ longest-running bilateral security pact. Is there any
reason to believe that this normative core could be subjected to severe challenge, so
severe, in fact, as to put in jeopardy the North American zone of peace? Yes, though
the chances of this occurring are extremely slight. Perhaps the only conceivable chal-
lenge to the security community resides in what Canada’s former minister of trans-
port, Jean Lapierre, termed his “worst nightmare,” that of a devastating terrorist
attack mounted against U.S. soil from Canada (cited by Allison, 2005: 717).
I include this scenario under the rubric the “New Fenianism” as a way of pro-
viding historical context via analogical reasoning. To be sure, analogies can never
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be anything other than imperfect, and this one looks, at first blush, to be more imper-
fect than most. For to Canadian readers with historical knowledge, the New Fe-
nianism conjures up an earlier threat to physical security that really was a Canadian
nightmare: the prospect of the country’s being invaded by swarms of Irish national-
ists based in the United States and possessed of an abiding grudge, not so much
against Canada as against Canada’s then colonial ruler, Great Britain. For the Fenians
of old, whose ranks in America had been filled by the massive migration triggered by
the Great Famine of 1847, the most tempting target in the campaign for Irish inde-
pendence was Canada; their jihad envisioned seizing Canada, and though this central
pillar of their strategic campaign may have failed to secure Irish independence, it
certainly played a considerable role in uniting the British North American colonies
in the tense period following the U.S. Civil War (see Jenkins, 1969).
Conceptually, what Fenianism in the nineteenth century represented was a dias-
pora’s bid to achieve world-order aims by attacking targets on North American soil.
The Old Fenians cared about Canada, but chiefly as a means to get Britain out of
Ireland. The “New Fenians” also have world-order objectives, the servicing of which
could involve strikes on North American soil as a means of forcing the pace of
developments elsewhere. In the case of the New Fenians, the aim is to dislodge the
U.S. not from North America (a patent impossibility), but rather from the Greater
Middle East.
But if the comparison might be an apt one in terms of objectives, does not the
difference in scale (tens of thousands of Irish-American jihadists versus a necessarily
unknown but definitely tiny number of contemporary Canada-based jihadists) ren-
der the analogy nugatory?25 Ordinarily, one would hesitate simply because of these
scale differences to suggest the analogy, except that in the case of modern terrorism,
as the events of 9/11 showed, it does not require vast numbers to make a major impact
on international security. Given the legitimate worry about terrorists acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, small numbers can more than equal, in death and des-
truction, what in an earlier era would have required veritable armies to accomplish.
As Robert Cooper notes, ideological groups can today make do with only a minuscule
fraction of the warriors who used to be required: “Henceforth, comparatively small
groups will be able to do the sort of damage which before only state armies or major
revolutionary movements could achieve.... A serious terrorist attack could be launched
by perhaps sixty people... 0.000001 per cent of the population is enough” (Cooper,
2004: ix).
25 Consider that about 140 000 Irish-Americans fought for the Union during the Civil War, and while most
of them had no desire actually to wage holy war against the object of their loathing, Britain, many did join
the ranks of the Fenian movement, whose so-called “armies” could boast of a strength on paper of more
than 7 000 men.
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To date, most of the Canadian jihadists involved in combat against the U.S. (and,
when you think about it, Canada as well, given the involvement of the Canadian
Forces in operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan) have acted outside of North
American territory. One recalls in this regard the astounding saga of the Khadr fam-
ily, made even more astounding by an early intervention of a Canadian prime minis-
ter, Jean Chrétien, to obtain the freedom from custody in Pakistan of the now-deceased
patriarch of the family, Ahmed Said Khadr, the Al Qaeda operative who enrolled
his four sons in the jihad that would eventually take his own life and severely mess
up theirs. As Colin Freeze has written apropos of the Chrétien involvement in this
case, “[t]he widespread chill and embarrassment caused by the prime minister’s
intervention for Mr. Khadr a decade earlier still ripples through the Canadian gov-
ernment and its counterterrorism cases today” (Freeze, 2005: A10).
But there is the even greater embarrassment of one prominent jihadist who did
attempt to strike a U.S. target (the Los Angeles international airport) from a base in
Canada, Ahmed Ressam. Although the so-called “millennium bomber” failed in his
plan, his arrest in December 1999 by U.S. border authorities in Washington state oc-
casioned a great deal of concern on the part of U.S. security officials, and did so well
before the heightened mood of anxiety resulting from the 9/11 attacks. Needless to
say, Jean Lapierre’s “nightmare” remains one for the entire Canadian security appa-
ratus, and should a devastating terrorist strike against the U.S. ever materialize from
Canadian soil, it would be difficult if not impossible to overstate the severity of its im-
pact, not just on Canada-U.S. relations, but also on the North American zone of peace.
At the source of U.S. security concerns regarding the Canada-U.S. border is the
perspective that terrorists can easily slip into Canada, as did Ressam and who knows
how many others, as a result of the country’s immigration policies, especially as they
pertain to the processing of refugee claims. According to statistics compiled by the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (and published in its 2003 Global
Refugee Trends), Canada had an acceptance rate for refugee claims of 49.1 percent,
which translated into Canada alone accepting fully one-fifth of all the asylum seekers
in an 18-state group of OECD countries (some 17 682 out of a total intake for the group
of 80 219). The country’s intake was disproportionately high because its acceptance
rate was so out of line with the western acceptance average of 15.1 percent, an aver-
age itself exceeded by only two other OECD states: the U.S., at 21.8 percent, and Italy,
at 16.3 percent (cited in Collacott, 2006: 87).
Obviously, the overwhelming majority of these refugees constitute no threat
whatsoever to Canadian or American –or anyone else’s– security. But it strains cre-
dulity, particularly in light of the empirical evidence in both Canada and the U.S.,
to imagine that no terrorists have slipped and are still slipping through the net.
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After all, most of those who struck New York and Washington on September 11 had
been residing legally in the U.S., and even those terrorists whose visas had expired
had initially possessed valid entry documentation. This leads to the not unnatural
suspicion among U.S. security officials about Canadian policy and administrative
practices, the logic being that if the U.S., as the target of the terrorists and therefore
taking security more seriously than most other states, can be so ineffective at keep-
ing out those who mean it harm, then how much less attentive to security must
Canadian authorities be?
But it is not just the patently illegal aspects of the New Fenianism that remain
a constant source of concern for security experts in the U.S., as well as in Canada.
There is also a completely legal aspect of the phenomenon that itself carries with it
implications for the quality of the Canada-U.S. relationship. Again, the analogy is
instructive, for while most of the Irish diaspora did not, in the end, take part in the
jihad against Canadian targets, that large diaspora did contribute to keeping Anglo-
American relations from developing into a strategic partnership until it was almost
too late. The Irish-Americans were hardly the only diaspora group in the U.S. to
delight in urging politicians to tweak the tail of the British lion (the even larger Ger-
man-American community also encouraged the pastime), but their presence, espe-
cially in major urban centers of the Northeast, was a constant reminder to political
leaders of the danger in working too closely with America’s fellow democracy across
the seas, Great Britain.
So, the way in which current immigration sources and patterns in Canada might
have an effect on the evolution of Canadian-American relations bears pondering,
given that considerable numbers of new arrivals hail from parts of the world that are
hardly sympathetic to the U.S. or its purposes, in this new century, dubbed by some
the “anti-American century” (Sweig, 2006). To be sure, as noted earlier, anti-Amer-
icanism in Canada hardly needs off-shore diasporas to stoke it; an electoral campaign
and a well-publicized trade wrangle seemed to be all that was required to turn Paul
Martin into Hugo Chávez, with the former prime minister attempting, unsuccessful-
ly, to secure re-election in early 2006 by running against George W. Bush. But there
is a difference between the variety of anti-Americanism as it is articulated in those parts
of the world where the United States is seen as an implacable cultural and political
enemy –parts of the world from which growing numbers of immigrants keep arriving
in Canada– and the anti-Americanism bubbling up in parts of the world where the
U.S. is still considered an ally and a partner, albeit an occasional annoyance.
If Canada’s traditional so-called anti-Americanism is of the “lite” (Naím, 2003:
95-96) and opportunistic variety (call it “Martinism” after its latest iteration in the
aforementioned federal election campaign), it remains to be seen what the longer-
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term impact of immigration flows betraying a rather less salubrious form of anti-Amer-
icanism will be. If the U.S. experience during the first half of the twentieth century in
developing a stable partnership with Britain is any indication, one might expect the
imported anti-Americanism of new immigrants to render the fashioning of a mature
and rational “America policy” in Ottawa more challenging, all things being equal.
However, just as Mexican anti-Americanism, another hoary phenomenon, is
unlikely to spell the difference between the preservation and the termination of the
North American security community –a community that took shape, it bears recalling,
at a time when Mexico’s public was at least as anti-American as it is today– so too
would it appear unlikely that a Canada becoming more anti-American pari passu with
its becoming more “globalized” must be a Canada that lives at greater risk of seeing
the North American zone of peace become a thing of the past. Its relationship with the
U.S., politically if not economically, would likely worsen in the process, but coun-
tries can have fairly mediocre relations with each other and still constitute a security
community. One thinks, in this respect, of U.S. relations with France: hardly the
West’s most vibrant strategic couple, but still far from being enemies, alarms to
the contrary notwithstanding.26
The key to the preservation of the Canada-U.S. security community will be in
controlling the illegal –both from the point of view of national and international
law– side of the New Fenianism, and preventing jihadists from reaching targets in
the United States, should that be their intent. For it is only this last prospect, of a
Canada-based strike with significant casualties, that has the ability fundamentally to
alter a security status quo that has been incredibly beneficial to Canadian, as indeed
to U.S., interests.
CONCLUSIONS
Although some readers might judge what I have to say in this article as verging on
the lugubrious, if not ridiculous, from the perspective of the query contained in the title,
my conclusions are, nevertheless, rather upbeat. If no one should deem the North
American zone of peace truly idiot proof (for there are things that could still go ter-
ribly wrong), the security community on the continent does remain a fairly robust
entity. And though at times community-building enthusiasts in North America might
show glimpses of “EU envy,” they would do well to reflect upon the reasons why some
(not all) aspects of integration seem to be more fully developed in Western Europe
than in North America.
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Simply put, the Europeans understood only too well, after the second global
conflagration of the twentieth century, that they had best develop means of dealing
with one another different from the oft-tried, painful methods associated with the
European balance-of-power. So they aspired to create, through the process of econom-
ic and political integration, a zone of peace among themselves. And by and large,
aided by a considerable injection of offshore resources and attention, to say nothing
of a looming Soviet threat, they succeeded in erecting a regional security communi-
ty, one whose preservation must always remain the uppermost concern of sentient
policymakers, for whom the risk entailed by a stalling or, worse, reversal, of inte-
gration continues to be that of intra-European war.27
By contrast, major war in North America has been a much more distant phe-
nomenon, hence the felt need for community-building à l’européenne has not been
as great. The Europeans erected their security community in the immediate aftermath
of their last intra-European bloodletting, so for them it is never a distant memory that
links integration and community-building with the preservation of peace. For the
North Americans, on the other hand, the same easy linkage cannot be drawn between
community-building and the avoidance of regional interstate war. They have, in so
many ways, had a much luckier recent past than the Europeans.
Nor should anyone lament that good fortune. Still, from time to time, it is well
to reflect upon the possibility that there need be nothing inevitable about the con-
tinuation of the North American zone of peace. This is why prudence is always
desirable, and when it comes to national security, the symbol of prudence must remain
efficient borders. Occasionally one hears discussions of a “security perimeter,”
either around the entire North American continent or just its northern half. Such dis-
cussions miss the basic point that it would be in no one’s interest if, say, the physi-
cal security of the U.S. were to depend, in the last resort, upon decisions taken (or
not taken) in Ottawa. It may once have been the case, as one student of Canada-U.S.
security relations has claimed, that “no fences make good neighbors” (Shore, 1998:
333-367). But in the current era, styled by some the “Long War,” it must remain the
responsibility of U.S. borders to serve as the final barrier against those who would
attack targets on American soil. It is simply unrealistic, the Kingston Dispensation
to the contrary notwithstanding, to expect Canadian authorities to be able to provide
that kind of barrier, even though they might wish to.
As for the issue of societal security, which is what is mainly at stake in the mat-
ter of the United States’ southern border, here an efficient frontier has to begin with
a serious discussion about the meaning of Mexican immigration to the U.S. Anyone
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who thinks that Nirvana can only be attained once the last Mexican illegal (or even
legal!) immigrant has returned home would be well-advised to watch Sergio Arau’s
film, Un día sin mexicanos (A Day without Mexicans), which details the disastrous
impact on the California economy of the sudden disappearance of the state’s 14 mil-
lion Hispanics (Aznárez, 2004: 32). Contained in this far-fetched scenario is the ker-
nel of an undeniable reality: that immigration from Mexico to the U.S. does bring
with it benefits to the American economy, and one can argue, society.
As with all things, there is a downside, and in this case it is easy to establish that
many criminals, including drug smugglers, have been operating along the U.S.-
Mexican border. But to date no one has documented any “New Fenians” seeking to
harm the United States from a Mexican base. There are reasons for this, perhaps the
most obvious being that the societal context that in Canada, the U.S., and Western
Europe can facilitate (willy-nilly) the growth of Islamist cells, namely the presence
of sizable immigrant communities from Islamic countries, is absent from Mexico.
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